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Abstract
EuropeanUnion (EU) trade policy is in the spotlight. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations
triggered substantial public mobilization which emerged in a surge of literature on trade politicization. Notwithstanding
politicization’s topicality and significance, it varies considerably over time, across trade agreements negotiations as well
as across EU member states. By picking up on the latter, this article examines why, despite similar economic benefits po-
tentially to be gained from trade liberalization, TTIP negotiations revealed striking differences in politicization in Germany
and the UK. Understanding this variation is illustrated by highlighting the impact of some of TTIPs’ substantial issues mo-
bilizing a range of materially and ideationally motivated stakeholders, who in turn shaped diverging governments’ trade
positions of the countries under scrutiny. In explaining this selective politicization across two European countries, focus is
on three explanatory variables, domestic material interests (business associations and trade unions), societal ideas (voters
and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) dominant in these countries’ domestic politics, as well as their interaction
with national institutions. For this reason, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed which
provides a detailed exploration of these three domestic factors, as well as the importance of their interdependence, in
shaping the TTIP positions of the UK and German governments.
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1. Introduction
Throughout the last decade European Union (EU) trade
policy, the oldest andmost integrated policy, was viewed
as a rather depoliticized and overlooked field of studies;
research and literature were slim (Dür & Zimmermann,
2007, p. 772). Recently a remarkable surge in research
has developed, due to alluring developments such as
the stronger involvement of the European Parliament in
trade policy decision making, the expansion of the trade
agenda including content previously detached from free
trade—triggering a more active engagement of non-
traditional societal actors—and negotiations with new,
essentially peer-like trade actors such as the United
States (US) and China (van Loon, 2018a). Particularly
due to the increase of public interest in and salience of
trade agreements negotiations, EU trade policy is in the
spotlight, suggesting that it, in contrast to the past, has
become a profoundly politicized policy area. Research
has picked up on the prominence of trade politicization,
specifically revealed by the recent special issues of the
Journal of European Integration (2017), the Journal of
European Public Policy (2019) and this current Politics
and Governance thematic issue. Equally, the European
Commission’s response to the increased public opposi-
tion to trade negotiations highlights a change from ‘busi-
ness as usual’; the time when EU trade policy was still
perceived as a technocratic activity and both the pub-
lic and the media were indifferent. In its Balanced and
Progressive Trade Policy, the Commission felt prompted
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to react to a continually changing environment and in-
creased public salience; ‘How we conduct trade policy
and trade negotiations matters. If the EU is to deliver ef-
fective agreements that benefit all citizens, the crafting
of these agreements must be accountable, transparent,
and inclusive’ (European Commission, 2017, p. 8).
Withstanding the trade politicization hype however,
this study acknowledges that, although claims about
politicization are contemporary as well as significant, it
varies considerably over time, across trade agreements
negotiations as well as across EU member states. EU
trade policy’s depiction as a highly contested issue area
with politicization spilling over to other trade agree-
ments, or to the idea of free trade in general, is thus
overly exaggerated (Young, 2019, p. 14). During the
time period from 2005 until 2016, despite the Eurozone
debt crisis and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) as well as the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, there
was no widespread hostility towards trade liberalization
with considerable majorities in all EU member states
having had continuous positive views of free trade,
ranging between 68% and 77% (Eurobarometer, 2017,
pp. 59–60). The fact that trade attitudes towards free
trade remained steady during these various stages sug-
gests that politicization has been more specific than gen-
eral. Simultaneously, this also mirrors public opposition
to TTIP being greater compared to any of the parallel EU
trade negotiations.
Understood as ‘an increase in the polarization of
opinions, interests or values, and the extent to which
they are publicly advanced towards the process of pol-
icy formulation within the EU’ (de Wilde, 2011, p. 566),
politicization did not play a decisive role in the ma-
jority of EU bilateral trade negotiations. Neither non-
traditional societal actors nor the general public or the
media paid significant attention to negotiations, thus
playing mere spectator roles in (the ongoing, concluded
or stalled) trade negotiations with developing countries
such as China, India, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam or
with developed countries such as Australia, Singapore,
South Korea and Japan. (Inter-)regional negotiations
such as those with the African, Caribbean and Pacific
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), the Andean
Community, the Central American region and Mercosur
did trigger some civil society resistance yet did not evolve
into a large-scale European public mobilization. Due to
the economic weight of the US and the EU, TTIP is the
largest trade and investment agreement ever attempted
and a prime example of what constitutes the next gen-
eration of a ‘deep’ trade agreement that led to ‘an un-
precedented public scrutiny’ (Malmström, 2015, p. 2).
Politicization’s asymmetric dispersion hence illustrates
that its occurrence was exceptional. This exceptionality
resulted in TTIP being the outlier (Young, 2019).
While literature explaining the topical emergence
of public mobilization during EU trade negotiations
is abundant (De Bièvre & Poletti, 2017; De Ville &
Siles-Brügge, 2016; Eliasson & Garcia-Duran Huet, 2019),
it is presently complemented by scholars stimulating a
research agenda in explaining the varying degrees of
politicization across such trade negotiations (De Bièvre
& Poletti, 2020; Meunier & Czesana, 2019). A consen-
sus exists about various explanations of why the TTIP
negotiations incited large public resistance. Accounting
for the emergence of politicization are exactly those
developments which instigated the abundant EU trade
policy research mentioned above; institutional changes
in the Lisbon Treaty, the content of trade and invest-
ment negotiations inducing stronger involvement of non-
traditional societal actors, as well as the role and nature
of the trading partner. Surprisingly, most efforts to ex-
plain the causes aswell as the variation of trade politiciza-
tion stubbornly focus on EU level institutions and actors
(business associations, civil society organizations and
trade unions). Despite scholars’ acknowledgement of
European governments’ significance in shaping the com-
mon EU trade negotiation positions (Dür& Zimmermann,
2007, p. 783; Laursen & Roederer-Rynning, 2017, p. 765),
the domestic level, ‘where trade policy making actually
begins and where member governments have to find ne-
gotiation positions that reflect their own domestic con-
straints’ (van Loon, 2018a, p. 166), is—excepting a hand-
ful of studies (Adriaensen, 2016; Bauer, 2016; Bollen,
2018; Bouza & Oleart, 2018; De Bièvre, 2018; Meunier
& Roederer-Rynning, 2020)—either mistakenly replaced
by viewing the EU level as the domestic level, or plainly
ignored. This lack of attention on the domestic level is
astonishing as it is the level where trade policy making
begins and where governments are constrained in find-
ing negotiation positions originating from domestic soci-
etal demands. Assessing domestic level influences shap-
ing governments’ trade positions is thus a vital preced-
ing component in comprehending how and why certain
trade positions are pursued at the EU level. This defi-
ciency, in looking at domestic factors to enrich knowl-
edge, theoretical and empirical, has been criticized by
van Loon (in press), who states that explanations for why
European governments vary in trade positions and prior-
ities, and how and by whom these are generated in the
domestic preference formation process, remain largely
unanswered. An accentuation on the origins of govern-
ments’ trade positions offer a timely and relevant point
of view and thus should be taken seriously in future re-
search on EU trade policy (van Loon, 2018b, p. 107).
This study hence aims to illuminate the domestic
level and—not by only opening but by explicitly unfold-
ing the black box—its goal is to trace and explain vari-
ation of politicization across the TTIP trade positions
of the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. Both coun-
tries are traditional advocates of trade liberalization and
were expected to be the main TTIP beneficiaries among
the EU countries (Felbermayr, Heid, & Lehwald, 2013,
p. 43). Yet at the height of trade politicization this did not
translate into similar TTIP positions. Whereas the British
government was a constant enthusiastic TTIP promoter,
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the German government, originally a fervent supporter,
gradually signaled a more reserved TTIP backing. It is
shown that politicization shaped the UK’s enthusiastic,
and Germany’s reserved, position on trade, correlating
with differences in interests and ideas prevalent in these
countries’ domestic politics. The article proceeds in the
following three steps. The next section, and while touch-
ing on several domestic politics approaches, presents
the societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation (Schirm, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2020). This includes
defining the variables, formulating the core hypotheses
and explaining the operationalization. This is followed by
the empirical case study which examines whether the
TTIP positions of the governments under scrutiny corre-
spond to domestic material interests or societal ideas,
andwhether these are in linewith national institutions in
a cross-country comparison. The last section concludes
with a brief comparative summary on the theoretical and
empirical findings.
2. The Societal Approach to Governmental Preference
Formation
The societal approach to governmental preference for-
mation is employed to account for the selective politi-
cization since its eminent accentuation on endogenous
societal considerations, interests, ideas and institutions
dominant in countries’ domestic politics, prior to interna-
tional or intergovernmental negotiations (Schirm, 2013,
p. 690), allows for not only opening but an explicit un-
folding of the black box in explaining variation in govern-
ments’ positions. While employing and augmenting do-
mestic politics theories such as IR liberalism (Moravcsik,
1997), domestic sources of economic policies (Goldstein
& Keohane, 1993; Keohane &Milner, 1996), historical in-
stitutionalism (Fioretos, 2011) as well as varieties of cap-
italism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), the societal approach, ‘de-
veloped as a complementary approach’ (Schirm, 2020,
p. 5) engages in a unique advancement and refinement
of these. Akin to these theories, its core assumption
is that, in democratic political systems, elected govern-
ments intent to remain in office; ergo their positions
mirror societal actors’ preferences. Yet, contrary to hail-
ing the importance of either domestic interests or ideas
or institutions, this analytical instrument embraces all
three domestic explanatory variables in explaining gov-
ernmental preference formation as the dependent vari-
able (Schirm, 2016, p. 68).
Goldstein and Keohane (1993, p. 25) and Milner
(1997, p. 16) point to domestic factors’ interrelation-
ship, yet truly exploring this interdependence requires
further theoretical development. Providing a systematic
examination of the individual role of domestic interests,
ideas and institutions, in supporting or opposing each
other, as well as their interplay in shaping governments’
positions is a crucial innovative aspect of the societal
approach. It is essential in advancing existing domestic
politics approaches, both theoretically and empirically,
which makes its distinctiveness a novelty. Consequently,
a theory-guided empirical investigation is incomplete
by solely determining which of these explanatory vari-
ables accounts for variation across governments’ posi-
tions. A further step is necessary to complete the pic-
ture, which involves analyzing why domestic interests
dominate in shaping government’s trade positions in
some cases, whereas ideas and institutions prevail in
other situations. Schirm (2020, p. 9) notes that this facet
on ‘the conditions under which each variable becomes
more important and prevails in shaping governmental
preferences’ is hitherto not included in previous domes-
tic politics approaches. By employing said variables this
study addresses the alluring developments such as the
expansion of the trade agenda triggering a more active
engagement of non-traditional societal actors. With EU
trade increasingly impinging countries’ domestic politics,
thereby mobilizing a range of materially and ideationally
motivated societal stakeholders, who aim to shape their
respective governments’ trade positions, this approach
is both timely and warranted.
Echoing previous scholars’ research output, the soci-
etal approach attaches domestic actors and structures
certain attributions. Building on and furthering Milner
(1997) and Moravcsik (1997), the ‘material interest’ vari-
able is defined as economic sectors’ short-term distri-
butional calculations which adjust promptly to alter-
ations in the international economy (e.g., the desire for
trade protection vs. the demand for trade liberalization).
‘Societal ideas’ are defined as voters’ durable, value-
based, shared expectations of apt government behavior
in steering the economy (e.g., trust in market forces vs.
governmental regulation). The definition of ‘national in-
stitutions’ expands on Fioretos’ (2011), as well Hall and
Soskice’s (2001) line of thought in identifying these as for-
mal arrangements of socio-economic coordination (e.g.,
coordinated market economy [CME] vs. liberal market
economy [LME]). In order to be able to account for a
broader array of domestic stakeholders, and the respec-
tive governments’ responsiveness to their demands, fur-
ther domestic actors are added in the analysis; The ma-
teriallymotivated sectoral business associations are com-
plemented by trade unions considered as sources for do-
mestic interests, and ideationally motivated voters are
complemented by NGOs as sources for societal ideas.
The variables’ explicit specification supports the ar-
ticulation of individual hypotheses proposing ‘conditions
under which each variable becomes more important’
(Schirm, 2020, p. 9) in shaping the governments’ trade
positions. These central hypotheses, accounting for the
impact of economic sectors (interests) and societal ex-
pectations (ideas), as well as domestic structures (in-
stitutions), are conceptualized, and inserted within the
trade context, as follows: 1) When economic sectors
face meaningful distributional calculations, material in-
terests predominate in shaping the governments’ TTIP
positions due to intense lobbying, and 2) when funda-
mental questions on the role of politics in steering the
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economy are affected and economic sectors face dif-
fuse distributional concerns, societal ideas will prevail in
shaping the governments’ TTIP positions. Accounting for
the variables’ interplay, the following hypothesis states
that when both cost-benefit calculations for economic
sectors as well as fundamental societal expectations on
governments’ apt role in steering the economy are af-
fected, then these compete andweaken, or reinforce and
strengthen each other in shaping governments’ TTIP po-
sitions. Additionally, when the issue concerns questions
on formal arrangements of socio-economic coordination,
the governments’ TTIP positions will be consistent with
national institutions. The effect of material interests and
societal ideas on governmental preference formation is
strengthened when these institutional frameworks are
present, while the absence of these national arrange-
ments dilute the influence of domestic factors’ in shap-
ing governmental positions (Schirm, 2016, p. 69).
In terms of operationalization, this study analyses
the rhetorical logic, the discourse between the domes-
tic stakeholders and responsible elected politicians in the
UK and Germany, during the TTIP negotiations, particu-
larly regarding the issues of the investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) mechanism and food safety standards,
covering the period 2013–2016. The relevance of the
three independent variables for the divergent govern-
ments’ TTIP positions is examined by identifying indica-
tors of the expectations of sectoral business associations,
trade unions, voters and NGOs during the TTIP negotia-
tions. Centre of attention are these actors’ statements
in press releases, position papers, public opinion polls,
official websites and secondary sources with the objec-
tive to identify the substantive origins and concerns at
the core of politicization. Material interests are demon-
strated through statements and positions papers of busi-
ness associations and trade unions in order to examine
the directly affected domestic economic sectors and the
incentives of sectoral lobbying vis-à-vis the respective
governments. Societal ideas are illustrated by measur-
ing public opinion polls revealing durable fundamental
expectations of voters in the form of values, as well as
by position papers and statements of NGOs, on the apt
governmental behavior in steering the economy, which
are viewedmore legitimate and acceptable in some TTIP
negotiations issues than in others. National institutions
are delineated by considering long-term complemen-
tarities resulting from two diverse institutional frame-
works shaped by the structure of national economies,
the CME–LME dichotomy, as well as the different im-
ages of government-society relations, in the form of
consensus-based vs. majoritarian competition-oriented
decision-making, which shows whether material inter-
ests and societal ideas tend to be consistent with these,
thus potentially having shaped the governments’ posi-
tions in TTIP negotiation issues.
Based on the assumption of governments’ aim to re-
main in office, thereby inducing responsivity, the depen-
dent variable is supported mainly by governmental doc-
uments and statements. Briefly put, evidence is sought
for a correlation between the stated concerns of support-
ers and opponents, and the respective governments’ re-
sponsiveness to these concerns in their preference for-
mation process during the TTIP negotiations. The UK and
Germany, under scrutiny due to their variation in TTIP
trade stances, were chosen to compare different sets
of interests, ideas and institutions—the UK representing
a LME shaped by financial services and Germany serv-
ing as a CME shaped by manufacturing—and concern-
ing the appropriate role of government—British adher-
ing more to trusting market forces and Germans attach-
ing more confidence to governmental regulation (World
Values Survey, 2005–2009). This dyad of ideas relates
to ‘path-dependent ideas and their codified institutional
form’ concerning the two countries’ political systems and
their political process of decision making (Schirm, 2011,
p. 58). In the case of the UK, this stresses a government
which acts as a referee among competing societal groups
and amorewinner-takes-it-all ‘majoritarian and competi-
tive decision-making,’ while in Germany, the government
is perceived as an intermediator through an inclusion of
all relevant societal groups in the form of ‘consensual
decision-making’ (van Loon, in press). Adoption of amost
different setting hence allows for the presumption that,
in a cross-country comparison, different domestic inter-
ests, ideas and institutions have indeed shaped the two
governments’ trade positions.
3. Unfolding the Black Box: Domestic Politics in the UK
and Germany
TTIP’s prime objective was ‘to increase trade and invest-
ment’ in order to create ‘jobs and growth through in-
creased market access and greater regulatory compati-
bility and setting the path for global standards’ through
four suggestedmeasures: (1) elimination of tariffs, (2) re-
ducing discriminatory policy measures supporting do-
mestic providers of goods and services, (3) increasing
convergence and mutual recognition of regulatory stan-
dards thereby lowering costs of EU and US suppliers, and
(4) including investment protection and ISDS (European
Council, 2014, p. 4). This illustrates the move from con-
centrating primarily on reducing border barriers to the
free movement of goods such as tariffs, from the 1990s
onwards focus was primarily on reducing behind-the-
border restrictions on goods and barriers to trade in ser-
vices. While in 2013, EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht
referred to TTIP as ‘the cheapest stimulus package that
can be imagined’ (De Gucht, 2013), in 2015, Trade
Commissioner Malmström made the case for TTIP as be-
ing a ‘no-brainer’ with increasing trade having ‘two over-
riding priorities: jobs and growth’ (Malmström & Hill,
2015). Following these two goals and the alleged pros-
perity it was supposed to bring, TTIP was thereby in
particular corresponding to the results of European re-
spondents’ opinion—more than six in ten citizens from
21 of the 27 EU member states believed that interna-
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tional trade should be a vector of domestic job cre-
ation (Eurobarometer, 2010, p. 70). Although the major-
ity of 24 EU member governments were in favor of TTIP
(Eurobarometer, 2016, p. 19) the [TTIP] discussion was ‘a
few degrees hotter in Germany than in other countries’
(Tost, 2015). Increased opposition to a EU FTA with the
US was particularly high in Germany—from 41% in 2014
to 52% in 2016—compared to a rather consistent low
percentage of opposition from UK respondents—19%
in both 2014 and 2016 (Eurobarometer, 2014, p. 202;
2016, p. 19).
In the following, the argument that both countries’
TTIP positions were shaped by material interests, soci-
etal ideas and national institutions will first of all be
examined by providing empirical data from British and
German business associations and trade unions which
is then followed by presenting public opinion data and
statements from NGOs. This data illustrates whether the
governments’ TTIP positions reflected the domestic fac-
tors dominant in these countries. The analysis will then
simultaneously highlight underwhich conditions the vari-
ables shaped the governments’ trade positions.
3.1. Material Interests in the UK and Germany
Leading umbrella business associations in both the UK
and Germany were in favor of TTIP, whereas both
countries’ trade unions were rather skeptical. The
Confederation of British Industry’s report A New Era for
Transatlantic Trade stated potential TTIP gains for small
andmedium-sized businesses from the harmonization of
regulatory standards, market access and export opportu-
nities for UK services, a rise of UK jobs due to an increase
in investment, as well as a larger range of products at
cheaper prices for consumers (CBI, 2014, p. 2). With the
US being the UK’s largest market outside the Eurozone,
the CBI believed that TTIP ‘was something worth pursu-
ing in the current economic climate’ (House of Commons,
2015, p. 6). CBI Brussels Director, SeanMcGuire, referred
to EU countries being party to investment treaties with
ISDS provision and stated the necessity to ‘uphold basic
rules on investor protection [as] the right of states to
regulate in the public interest, would help set a prece-
dent for EU investment negotiations with other strate-
gic trading partners like China’ (Policy Review, 2015).
The British Chamber of Commerce equally supported
free trade between the EU and the US, particularly for
small and medium-sized companies. Director General,
John Longworth, stressed that ‘firms across the UK will
cheer a free trade deal that helps them gain new op-
portunities in US markets’ (Longworth, 2015). The Trade
Union Congress (TUC) acknowledged the potential eco-
nomic benefits of TTIP, and noted that the reduction of
tariffs and economic regulations, ‘could genuinely lead
to greater trade and greater benefits to all’ in specific
sectors such as the automobile and chemical industries
(House of Commons, 2015, p. 6). It was however uncer-
tain about potential job creation and viewed that the
threats to public services, workers’ rights as well as en-
vironmental and food standards would outweigh any po-
tential benefits. The TUC believed that TTIP’s primary
purpose was to privilege foreign investors by providing
transnational corporations with more power and influ-
ence, enabling them to sue states whose laws or actions
are deemed incompatible with free trade. TUC’s Sally
Hunt, expressed its opposition ‘to ISDS in TTIP and in-
deed any trade deal as it is undemocratic and against the
public interest to allow foreign investors to use special
secretive courts to sue governments for making public
policy they think is bad for business’ (TUC, 2014).
In a survey from the Association of German
Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), TTIP was
welcomed by an overwhelming majority from German
industry—70% of the German ‘Mittelstand’ regarded
TTIP as positive. Featuring the most important issue of
85% of respondents in facilitating bilateral trade was the
adaptation or mutual recognition of equivalent norms,
standards and certifications, followed by simpler cus-
toms clearance which was important for 83% of respon-
dents. This number was even higher in the retail and
agri-food industry branches (91% and 90%, respectively).
Tariff elimination was viewed by 75% of respondents as
important, especially for the retail and the agri-food sec-
tors (both 82%), as well as for the automobile industry
and suppliers (81%). The DIHK and other leading busi-
ness associations, the Federation of German Industries,
the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations,
and the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts issued
a joint statement calling for an ambitious and fair trade
and investment agreement and to ‘make use of this op-
portunity’ (Federation of German Industries, 2014, p. 1)
in removing barriers in the transatlantic market, thereby
‘achieving more growth, more employment, newmarket
opportunities and therefore future prospects for compa-
nies and employees’ (Federation of German Industries &
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations, 2014,
p. 2). Leading the pro-TTIP campaign, the Federation of
German Industries viewed the ISDS compatible with gov-
ernments’ ability to regulate, as well as an opportunity
to reform the international investment system and to in-
troduction higher standards for future trade agreements
(Mildner, 2014). In its first position paper of 2013, the
Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) criticized
the US’ non-ratification of six out of eight basic core la-
bor standards of the International Labor Organization
and called for a suspension of the TTIP trade negotia-
tions. It demanded that ‘one of the objectives of the
agreement with the US must be an improvement of la-
bor rights everywhere’ (DGB, 2013, p. 4). In its position
paper one year later, it stated its main concerns, the
different levels of protection for consumers, the environ-
ment as well as the workforce, and called for TTIP ‘to
provide greater prosperity for a broader segment of the
population, improve economic, social and environmen-
tal standards, and create structures for fair competition
and good working conditions’ (DGB, 2014, p. 4).
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3.2. Societal Ideas in the UK and Germany
At TTIP’s launch in 2013, both UK (58%) and German
(56%) attitudes among the general public were positive
towards increased trade and investment between the EU
and the US. Attitudes were equally similar towards free
trade in general, with 77% of UK respondents and 74% of
German respondents being supportive (Eurobarometer,
2014). When asked about specific TTIP support, 39% of
German respondentswere in favor and 41% respondents
were against TTIP, while 65% of respondents were in fa-
vor and 19%were against TTIP in the UK (Eurobarometer,
2014). German TTIP attitudes declined in 2015 with 31%
in favor and 51% of respondents against the agreement.
The numbers stayed relatively stable in the UK with
63% in favor of TTIP and 20% of respondents against
(Eurobarometer, 2015). Van Loon (2018a, p. 172) points
to these varying German public attitudes towards in-
creased economic relations with the US, free trade in
general and TTIP attitudes in specific. German attitudes
towards TTIP were thus not related to free trade in gen-
eral; instead ‘the potential partner and the agreements’
content unrelated to trade’ is what mattered (Jungherr,
Mader, Schoen, & Wuttke, 2018, p. 216). Reflecting the
four measures to achieve TTIP’s objectives, tariffs, reg-
ulations, rules and investment, the issues of perceived
governments’ limitation in regulating the domestic mar-
ket potentially leading to a decline in consumer protec-
tion and supposed loss of democratic accountability due
to the agreement’s ISDS introduction, were prominent
in the German public discourse. As opposed to tradi-
tional tariff cutting trade issues, public TTIP attitudes
were less focused on the potential threat of increased
international competition, but rather on its impact on
national or European standards and policy processes as
the agreement could bemisused by companies as a back
door, circumventing and undermining consumer protec-
tion rights as well as environmental standards: 51% of
respondents opposed the harmonization of US and EU
standards for products and services, 53%was against the
removal of restrictions on investment between the EU
and the US, while a vast majority of Germans showed
fundamentally high trust levels in European standards
on issues such as food safety (94%), auto safety (91%)
and environmental safety (96%) (Pew Research Center &
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014, pp. 22–23).
Regarding food safety concerns, 56% of Germans be-
lieved that chlorinated chicken poses a health risk (Stern,
2014). This highlights the connection between Germans’
beliefs in consumer protection and their strong prefer-
ences for governmental regulation; German respondents
attach a greater significance to the role of government in
steering the economy, whereas the British counterparts
are more supportive of responsibility of market forces,
reflecting both countries’ capitalism types as a LME and
CME (Schirm, 2011, p. 51). Against this background, a cru-
cial factor in German TTIP attitudes was their skeptical
view of transatlantic relations inciting a general distrust
in German–American relations (Braml, 2014). In 2014,
73% of respondents thought that the US buying German
companies would be negative for the German economy
(Pew Research Center & Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014,
p. 23) while almost the majority (49%) believed that it
would hurt the economy if the US would build new fac-
tories in Germany (Pew Research Center & Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2014, p. 22). This correlateswith results from
the Pew Research Center which reveals that America’s
international image has become more negative among
German respondents since 2011, falling from 62% having
a favorable opinion in 2011 to 50% in 2015, vs. 61% of UK
respondents viewing the US positively in 2011 against a
slight increase, reaching 65% assigning a positive rating,
in 2015 (Pew Research Center, 2015, p. 13).
Much backlash against TTIP came from civil soci-
ety groups, and UK and German NGOs’ criticism par-
ticularly focused on the ISDS and TTIP’s potential risks
on environmental, consumer, health and labor rights.
The German NGO sector, an alliance of around 70
members, created an online platform ‘TTIP unfairhan-
delbar’ (www.ttipunfairhandelbar.de) and provided crit-
ical views thereby informing members about discus-
sion events and demonstrations. The British NGO sec-
tor created a similar counterpart ‘NoTTIP’ (https://
www.nottip.org.uk) with around 50 members. Rejecting
ISDS, the German NGO alliance demanded ‘legal pro-
tection for people—instead of privileged right of action
for corporations’ dismissing giving international compa-
nies ‘their own special rights to take action against gov-
ernments’ (Forum on Environment and Development,
2014, p. 2). With the ISDS favoring investors, and not
citizens, as well as facilitating the protection of foreign,
and not national, investors’ rights, this was severely criti-
cized. German and UK NGOs stated that the ISDS ‘threat-
ens to undermine the most basic principles of democ-
racy’ (Hilary, 2015, p. 30). Regarding the position on food
safety standards, NGOs in both countries feared that the
agreement would result in a so-called race to the bottom
on European food safety standards. The ‘TTIP unfairhan-
delbar’ NGO alliance stated that the non-negotiability
of the alleged stricter European standards should not
be diminished ‘nor undermined by a mutual recogni-
tion of American and European standards’ (Forum on
Environment and Development, 2014, p. 2). In the UK,
a War on Want position paper (member of the ‘NoTTIP’
alliance) voiced its concern of TTIP’s potential impact on
public services, in specific the ‘further market opening’
or the potential ‘to lock-in past privatizations of the NHS’
and demanded ‘a full and un-equivocal exclusion of all
public services from any EU trade agreements and the
ongoing trade negotiations’ (War on Want, 2015, p. 46).
3.3. Domestic Factors Shaping Governments’ TTIP
Positions
UK Prime Minister David Cameron, strongly in favor of
TTIP said, ‘there is no more powerful way to achieve
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[economic growth] than by boosting trade’ (Cameron,
2013). The UK government acknowledged TTIP’s large
benefits ‘adding as much as £10 billion annually to the
UK economy in the long-term’ as well as increasing jobs
and lower prices for goods and services (UKGovernment,
2014, p. 5). Softening concerns about inclusion of the
NHS and challenges of potential ISDS provisions were
issued by Lord Livingston of Parkhead, then Business,
Innovations and Skills’ (BIS) Minister of State emphasiz-
ing that ‘TTIP will not change the fact that it is up to the
UK to decide how public services, including the NHS, are
run’ (BIS, 2014). This was supported by Cameron who
deemed these concerns ‘nonsense’ as ‘there is no threat,
I believe, fromTTIP to theNational Health Service andwe
should just knock that on the head as an empty threat’
(Cameron, 2014). The government, having signed numer-
ous trade agreements including investment protection
provisions, and thus in favor of the ISDS, had brought
arguments to the fore that this mechanism would need
to find the right balance between investment protection
and the rights of the national government to regulate.
BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable said that ‘neither the
investment protection provisions nor decisions arising
from ISDS cases will affect the ability of the UK govern-
ment to regulate fairly and in the public interest’ (Cable,
2014). This thus illustrates that although there was a cer-
tain ambivalence between material interests as well as
among societal ideas, the government did not include
all competing domestic groups, as its stance was shaped
more by those material interests and societal ideas that
favored TTIP.
In Germany, the Christian Democratic (CDU)/Social
Democratic (SPD)-led government clearly stated the
commitment towards a speedy conclusion of TTIP
(Christian Democratic Union, 2013, p. 13). It however
adopted a skeptical stance in 2014 regarding the ISDS
issue. Opposition came especially from the governing
SPD, calling for the exclusion of the mechanism in TTIP.
In March 2014, the SPD party leader, Vice Chancellor
and Economics Minister, Sigmar Gabriel emphasized the
governments’ position in a letter to then EU Trade
Commissioner De Gucht. Gabriel wrote that the US and
Germany already offered adequate legal protections to
investors, so that ISDS provisions would not be required
in a transatlantic agreement (Handelsblatt, 2014). Since
then, the SPD had somewhat rowed back concerning
its ISDS position. During the CETA negotiations, Gabriel
backed down by stating that ‘if the rest of Europe
wants this agreement, then Germany must also approve’
(Sarmadi, 2014). Chancellor Angela Merkel (2015a), call-
ing for a TTIP ‘which has many winners’ stated that the
many investment protection agreements Germany previ-
ously negotiated had not been under public scrutiny and
that TTIP would induce ‘a new international standard for
investment protection.’ She diluted concerns saying that
such provisions ‘were of great importance to many com-
panies in Germany because they were protected from
arbitrary situations in certain countries to which they
would otherwise have been exposed’ (Merkel, 2015a).
Businesses, service providers and consumers would gar-
ner benefits from TTIP, leading to reduced prices, a larger
range of products, a rise in sales resulting in generat-
ing an increase in jobs, yet ‘our standards, for instance
on consumer protection, environmental protection and
health protection are non-negotiable’ (Merkel, 2015b).
The government and the DGB issued a joint position pa-
per in which they stressed TTIP opportunities in intensi-
fying trade relations making trade fair and sustainable,
yet both emphasized that trade issues such as workers’
rights, consumer protection, social and environmental
standards were not to be jeopardized (BMWi, 2014, p. 1).
This joint paper illustrates the German government’s re-
sponsiveness to material interests in favor of TTIP, but
also to interests opposed to TTIP. However, its position
corresponded equally well to the concerns of societal
ideas, and thus its reserved TTIP stance was shaped by
the ambivalence of both types of domestic factors, inter-
ests and ideas, which was the result of its inclusion of all
domestic groups.
4. Conclusion
The goal of this article was to trace and explain selec-
tive politicization across the TTIP trade positions of the
UK and Germany. It has illustrated that a trade agree-
ment’s content can fuel politicizationwhenabroad range
ofmateriallymotivated and ideationallymotivated stake-
holders are affected by this. In line with the societal ap-
proach to governmental preference formation, the TTIP
positions of the UK and Germany were strongly shaped
by material interests, societal ideas and national insti-
tutions. These domestic variables’ significance has been
theoretically stressed and empirically examined, thereby
accounting for the predominance of material interests
when the issue at stake concerns distributional conse-
quences for economic sectors, while societal ideas dom-
inate when fundamental concerns of the role of govern-
ment in steering the economy are at stake. When both
are affected, they can either compete and weaken each
other, or reinforce and strengthen each other, while the
governments’ positions are consistent with national in-
stitutions when the issue concerns questions of formal
arrangements of socio-economic coordination.
The UK government’s position was shaped by the
preferences of business associations’ who were directly
affected by TTIP’s distributional impact. Although UK
business interests favored TTIP, and the TUC represented
a skeptical TTIP stance, material interests nevertheless
shaped an enthusiastic and strong government position.
This variables’ ambivalencemeans that the trade union’s
concerns did not weaken business interests’ preferences
in shaping the UK government’s position. Thus, a posi-
tion corresponding more to those material interests in
favor of TTIP also correlates with LME institutions and
societal ideas of trust in market forces. In addition, con-
cerning the trade issues, especially regulation and safety
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standards, the government showed a weak responsive-
ness to the concerns of NGOs. The ambiguous relation-
ship between NGOs opposed to TTIP and voters in favor
of TTIP, illustrates that the former did not weaken the
latter. In sum, business associations and voters were pre-
dominant in shaping the UK’s TTIP position.
Equal to the UK government’s stance, its German
counterpart corresponded to material interests, directly
affected by TTIP’s potential distributional consequences.
Again, these concerns were not identical, as business
associations were strongly supportive, yet trade unions
were against TTIP, thus weakening each other. The gov-
ernment included these ambivalent material interests in
its trade policy position. On issues such as the role of gov-
ernment in steering the economy, ISDS, and food safety
standards, theGermanTTIP stance correlatedwith the in-
stitutions of the CME and corresponded to societal ideas
of trust in governmental regulation, with the voters’ and
NGOs’ concerns reinforcing each other. Overall it should
be noted, that with the trade union (DGB), NGOs, and
voters all opposed to TTIP, the reserved German TTIP po-
sitionwas shaped by both domestic factors, interests and
ideas, and thus in line with national institutions.
The aim of this article was to provide an explanation
of the differences in politicization in the UK and Germany
during the TTIP negotiations, thereby illuminating the do-
mestic level of EU trade policy making by unfolding the
black box and specifying a comprehensive understand-
ing of the countries’ domestic politics. The employed so-
cietal approach to governmental preference formation
and its distinctiveness in complementing domestic poli-
tics approaches emphasizes the explicit specification of
the domestic variables, interests, ideas and institutions.
This supports the conceptualization of the hypotheses
empirically examining the conditions for the prevalence
of these vis-à-vis each other. Since the bulk of the liter-
ature on EU trade policy has long marginalized the do-
mestic level, this study has shown the explanatory power
of the societal approach in embracing all three domes-
tic factors and explaining their origins, as well as their
interdependence, in shaping the varying TTIP positions
of the UK and German governments. As EU trade policy
will remain in full spotlight for years to come, this con-
tribution has thus made the case for a future accentua-
tion on domestic factors for understanding the selective
trade politicization across EU member states.
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